



Environmental Ethics: An Overview

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Abstract

This essay provides an overview of the field of environmental ethics. I sketch the major debates in the field from its inception in the 1970s to today, explaining both the central tenets of the schools of thought within the field and the arguments that have been given for and against them. I describe the main trends within the field as a whole and review some of the criticisms that have been offered of prevailing views.

1. *A Brief History*

Although philosophy has a long history of theorizing about the place of humans in the natural world, environmental ethics as a subfield of philosophy didn't really get its start until the early 1970s. Partly as a result of the growing environmental consciousness and social movements of the 1960s, public interest increased in questions about humans' moral relationship with the rest of the natural world. In the field of philosophy, a number of theorists at that time came to believe that traditional ethical theories were unable to provide an adequate account of this relationship.¹ The motivation for the earliest work in environmental ethics, then, was a desire to formulate ethical theories that did a better job of accounting for our moral obligations to the nonhuman natural world.²

2. *Anthropocentrism*

The inadequacy of traditional ethical theories was initially attributed to their anthropocentrism – i.e., to their assumption that human beings and/or their interests matter morally in their own right while everything else matters morally only insofar as it affects human beings and/or their interests.³ Any view that understands morality simply as a matter of the obligations that humans have to one another, early theorists argued, cannot claim that humans have direct moral obligations to the natural world; thus, such views fail to capture an essential aspect of our relationship with the natural world. This point was illustrated most clearly by Richard Routley's 'last person' case.⁴ Routley asks the reader to imagine that some catastrophe has

killed every other human being on earth such that there is only one person left alive. If this person were dying, and if with his or her last dying breath it would be possible to push a button that would destroy the rest of life on earth (plants, animals, ecosystems, etc.), would there be anything morally wrong about doing so? Routley's worry is that anthropocentric theories cannot explain why it would be morally wrong to push the button under these circumstances. If moral obligations come from the interests of humans, then once humans and their interests cease to exist, so do moral obligations. To put the point another way, if the natural world has value only insofar as it serves human interests, then in a case in which the natural world cannot possibly serve our interests (because we no longer exist), it can have no value, and thus there is nothing wrong with destroying it.⁵

In order to explain what would be wrong with pushing the button in the last person case, early environmental ethicists argued, ethical theories need to claim that the natural world has value that is independent of humans and/or their interests and that our moral obligations regarding the natural world aren't just a matter of what we owe to our fellow humans. Only by meeting these theoretical criteria can we arrive at an ethic (as Tom Regan describes it) 'of the environment, rather than an ethic *for the use* of the environment' ('Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic' 20).

3. *Intrinsic Value*

Many early theorists took this to mean that an adequate environmental ethic must ascribe intrinsic value to at least some part of the natural world. Whereas anthropocentrism claimed that human beings/interests have value in their own right and that everything else has value only insofar as it benefits human beings/interests, nonanthropocentric alternatives claimed that the natural world and/or its parts have value in their own right, independently of their effect on human beings/interests. To claim that parts of the natural world have value in their own right just is to claim that they have intrinsic value.⁶ Another way of putting this point that was popular in the early environmental ethics literature was to say that anthropocentrism attributes only instrumental value to the nature (i.e., values it only as a means to human ends), whereas nonanthropocentrism attributes intrinsic value to at least some parts of nature (i.e., values them as ends in themselves). These apparent conceptual connections between anthropocentrism and intrinsic value claims led many theorists to agree with J. Baird Callicott that 'how to discover intrinsic value in nature is the defining problem for environmental ethics' ('Intrinsic Value in Nature' paragraph 9).

Writers have since criticized some of the conceptual connections posited by this early work. Many have pointed out that it is possible to reject anthropocentrism without positing the existence of intrinsic value in the natural world. That is to say, one can reject the view that something

has value insofar as it serves human interests, but still think that its value depends on its serving interests of some kind. Thus a view that says that the value of a plant depends on whether it serves the interests of some divine entity, or the interests of the ecosystem, or the interests of all sentient beings, will count as nonanthropocentric but not in virtue of attributing intrinsic value to the plant.⁷

In addition to this, the attribution of instrumental value does not seem to require the attribution of intrinsic value in the way that early theorists often claimed.⁸ The assumption that things can have value as a means to an end (instrumental value) only if there is something that has value as an end in itself (intrinsic value) seems to assume a particular foundationalist theory of justification. That is to say, it assumes that in order for our value claims to be justified there must be at least one thing that has value independently of its relations to other things and that serves as the ultimate justification for all other value claims.⁹ However, it is at least conceptually possible for all value to be instrumental – for all values to be defined by their contribution to other values. Rather than leading to an infinite regress, as some theorists have claimed, this might instead be thought to describe an interconnected web of value claims. Following models first described in epistemology, this view of justification is coherentist rather than foundationalist, but it does seem to allow for the justification of instrumental value claims without appeal to intrinsic values.

Critics have also questioned some of the conceptual relationships assumed by early discussions of intrinsic value. First, the opposition of instrumental to intrinsic value is perhaps misleading. Not only might there be other types of nonintrinsic (i.e., extrinsic) value besides instrumental value (i.e., other ways of being valuable in virtue of a relation to some other valuable thing besides being an instrument for achieving the other valuable thing), but the kind of independence from other things that is implied by intrinsic value might well be thought to be metaphysical independence rather than independence in the way that valuers care about the good.¹⁰ Thus some theorists reserve the term ‘intrinsic value’ for the kind of value that things have in virtue of their intrinsic (i.e., nonrelational) properties or for the kind of value that ‘inheres in the thing itself’.¹¹ To say that a thing has intrinsic value in one of these latter senses is to make a claim very different from the claim that it has noninstrumental value. Second, many early discussions of intrinsic value assume that to possess intrinsic value is to have moral standing – i.e., to be the kind of thing the interests of which moral agents ought to consider in their moral deliberations.¹² However, whether things with intrinsic value are thereby morally considerable (or vice versa) appears to depend on other features of an ethical theory. If one believes that things without interests can still be bearers of intrinsic value, then not everything that has intrinsic value will have moral standing (since not everything with intrinsic value will be such that we can take its interests into account). Likewise, if one believes that we

might have other reasons for considering a thing's interests in our moral deliberations besides facts about that thing's value, then not everything with moral standing will have intrinsic value. The relationship between moral standing and intrinsic value, then, seems to depend on other features of one's moral theory and doesn't follow simply from the concept of intrinsic value itself.¹³

These later criticisms aside, much of the early work in environmental ethics was aimed at justifying claims about the intrinsic value of the natural world and/or its parts. In order to justify the claim that parts of the natural world have value independently of humans and/or their interests, many theorists felt the need to say something about what value is and in what sense it could exist in the world independently of human valuers. The ethical theories of J. Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston, III are examples of this kind of project. Callicott proposed a version of projectivism, the view that values are projections of our subjective states (e.g., sentiments) onto the world. According to this view, things can only have value as a result of being valued by valuers, but this does not mean that the natural world cannot have intrinsic value. A thing has intrinsic value, on Callicott's account, insofar as it is valued intrinsically. If we value the natural world not as a means to our ends but as an end in itself, Callicott argues, then the natural world possesses intrinsic value.¹⁴

Holmes Rolston, III criticizes Callicott's account of value, claiming that because Callicott still deems humans to be necessary for the possession of value by anything, his view is unacceptably human-centered.¹⁵ Rolston proposes instead a theory that extends the traditional understanding of what kind of activity constitutes 'valuing' so that included within it is the striving of any organism to achieve its biologically-given goals. Stretching the concept of 'valuing' so that it now covers all goal-directed behavior of living things enlarges the class of valuers to include all organisms. On this view, the existence of value in the world still requires the existence of valuers, since, Rolston claims, valuing confers value on both the valuer and the object of valuation. However, since any kind of organism can count as a valuer, the account does not tie the existence of value to the existence of human beings in particular.¹⁶

Both Callicott's and Rolston's accounts of value have been criticized on metaethical and normative grounds. Metaethically, Callicott's theory seems to inherit all of the standard problems of projectivism, as well as those of subjectivist theories generally, while Rolston's theory seems to inherit all of the standard problems of a simple, reductive naturalism.¹⁷ Normatively, both theories seem to make it impossible for the valuing of valuers to be mistaken – both appear to claim that to be valuable is to be the object of actual valuing. Later theorists have attempted to address these concerns, and analyses of the nature and bearers of value within environmental ethics have increasingly incorporated theoretical innovations developed within mainstream metaethics and normative ethics.¹⁸

4. *Holism and Individualism*

One issue that arose in early debates about the value of the natural world was the question of what kinds of entities are morally significant in their own right. Some theorists argued that individual persons, animals, plants, etc. are valuable in their own right, while the value of the larger wholes that these individuals comprise – species, ecosystems, the biosphere, etc. – is merely derivative of the value of the individual constituents.¹⁹ This view came to be called individualism; theories generally considered to be forms of individualism are biocentrism (the view that each living thing matters morally in its own right) and animal rights (the view that some or all animals have moral rights). Others argued that we should consider wholes to be the primary bearers of value and the value of individuals to depend on the contribution that those individuals make to the good of the wholes.²⁰ This view came to be called holism; the most common type of holism in environmental ethics is ecocentrism (the view that ecosystems matter in their own right, and individuals have value in virtue of the contribution they make to ecosystemic functioning).

Proponents of holism argue that it, unlike individualism, is able to attribute greater or lesser value to individuals depending on their contribution to ecosystemic processes. Individualist theories, they argue, must attribute value to all living things equally, with the result that common animals such as sheep or pigs have as much value as members of rare or endangered species, that domesticated animals have as much value as wild animals, that members of destructive invasive species have as much value as the members of the native species that they threaten, and so on. Holists argue that egalitarianism about the value of individual organisms is ecologically wrong-headed; some individuals simply have more ecological value than others, and an adequate environmental ethic needs to take account of this difference.²¹

Proponents of individualism, however, charge that holists unjustifiably disregard the worth of individuals by considering their worth to be derivative of their ecological contributions. Some individualists have labeled holists ‘eco-fascists’, a way of emphasizing their worries about views that consider individuals to have value only insofar as they contribute to the greater good of the communities to which they belong.²² Other individualists argue that wholes such as ecosystems and species do not have a good of their own, and thus that their value must be derivative of the value of individual organisms, which do have a good of their own.²³

This debate between individualists and holists is partly responsible for tensions among proponents of animal rights and proponents of holistic approaches within environmental ethics.²⁴ Over the years, the differences between these approaches eventually became so great that some theorists began to consider animal rights a distinct field from environmental ethics and commitment to holism to be a defining feature of environmental

ethics.²⁵ As criticisms of holism became more common, however, the assumption that environmental ethics must involve an allegiance to holism faced increasing skepticism. Today, both holist and individualist approaches are well-accepted within environmental ethics and while some tensions still remain, the rift between animal rights and the rest of environmental ethics is beginning to diminish.

5. Criticisms of the Dominant Trends within Environmental Ethics

While the search for nonanthropocentric ethical theories dominated the early years of environmental ethics, by the early 1990s some theorists began to express misgivings about the centrality of this project to the field as a whole. One set of critiques came from a group of philosophers who took issue with the field's focus on abstract questions about value rather than on environmental policy problems. Calling themselves 'environmental pragmatists' (in reference to their philosophical affinities with American pragmatism), they argued for a reorientation of environmental ethics away from 'the intramural debates of environmental philosophers' and toward philosophical pursuits more likely to have a practical impact on environmental policy (Light and Katz 1).

While many environmental ethicists agreed that the field should aspire to greater relevance in policy-making, opinions differed about which changes in philosophical approach would accomplish this. Some philosophers argued that the problem with older theories in environmental ethics was their commitment to a kind of moral monism (roughly, the view that all moral justification must appeal to a unified theory of what makes things good, bad, right, or wrong). These theorists argued instead for the adoption of moral pluralism (roughly, the denial of moral monism).²⁶ Rather than argue over what the correct ethical theory is, as a commitment to moral monism might be thought to require, proponents suggested that adopting pluralism would allow us to utilize the resources of a number of different ethical approaches according to their usefulness for solving different kinds of problems. But even among proponents of moral pluralism, what kind of pluralism environmental ethics should aspire to was a matter of some controversy. Candidates include value pluralism, the view that there are different kinds of value not just different amounts of value, practical pluralism, the view that we can have different correct ethical norms that give us recommendations for action,²⁷ principle pluralism, the view that a number of mutually inconsistent ethical principles can all be accepted as correct,²⁸ and theoretical pluralism, the view that a number of mutually inconsistent ethical theories can all be accepted as correct.²⁹ As might be expected, the more minimal forms of pluralism (value pluralism and practical pluralism) have been more widely accepted than the more robust forms (principle pluralism and theoretical pluralism) have been.

Some philosophers, perhaps Bryan Norton most prominently, argued that pragmatism also suggests that environmental ethicists should accept anthropocentrism and give up the search for nonanthropocentric theories of value. As Norton points out, many policy-makers as well as the social scientists whose views affect environmental policy (e.g., economists) assume the truth of anthropocentrism. In order to have more productive interactions with those who formulate environmental policy, Norton argues, environmental ethics should accept anthropocentrism and seek out anthropocentric justifications for environmental preservation.³⁰

Norton argues for a version of anthropocentrism that he calls 'weak anthropocentrism' (later termed 'broad anthropocentrism'), a theory according to which

all value countenanced by [the theory] is explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual or by reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist as elements in a world view essential to determinations of considered preferences. ('Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism' 134)³¹

He also argues for what he calls 'the convergence hypothesis', which is the view that anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism will recommend the same environmental policies.³² If Norton is right, then anthropocentric theories might be able to do just as good a job of supporting a robust environmental ethic as nonanthropocentric theories.

Finally, many environmental ethicists, including those not identified with environmental pragmatism, have argued that the focus on a search for nonanthropocentric theories of value has led environmental ethicists to ignore the importance of justice claims among humans for the purposes of environmental policy. First, many philosophers have pointed out that the question of what obligations, if any, we have to future generations of people is of tremendous importance to decisions about how to allocate natural resources, how (and whether) to control pollution, etc. Discussions of obligations to future generations first arose in environmental ethics in relation to debates in the 1970s and 1980s about the use of nuclear energy.³³ Since nuclear energy produces radioactive waste that remains dangerous for millions of years, some environmental ethicists argued that nuclear energy involves a kind of intergenerational injustice: imposing costs on future generations for the sake of benefits to current people. Making this argument, however, requires explaining how future people, who do not exist and might never come into existence depending on our actions, can nonetheless have interests that generate obligations for those of us currently alive.³⁴

The question about justice toward future generations is one way we might think that the issue of what kind of treatment people owe to one another is relevant to environmental policy, but there are others as well. Beginning in the 1980s, activists within the fledgling Environmental

Justice Movement argued that environmental ethics had wrongly ignored questions about the fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. Both nationally and internationally, they pointed to cases where environmental goods were distributed in such a way that wealthy and otherwise privileged people enjoyed the benefits of these environmental goods but poor or otherwise disadvantaged people bore their burdens.³⁵ A properly constituted environmental ethic, they argued, should care at least as much about the just distribution of environmental goods among people as it does about the question of whether bacteria have interests.

Finally, there are two schools of thought within environmental philosophy that have existed alongside the dominant discussions almost since the field's inception. Some of their central claims have been incorporated into mainstream discussions over the years; others have not. The first school of thought is called deep ecology and was founded by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess.³⁶ Naess proposed that an adequate response to environmental problems required a shift not only in our ethical claims, but also in our metaphysical and epistemological assumptions about the world. Ethically, he advocated 'biospherical egalitarianism', the view that all living things have an equal right to flourish (95–6). Living up to this principle, Naess argued, requires humans to radically rethink our modes of life, including our economic activity, our political institutions, and our acceptance of human population growth. Metaphysically, Naess argued for a revised understanding of the self, in which the self is seen as relational rather than discrete and bounded, and in which it is seen as including aspects of the natural world rather than distinct from the natural world. With this extended conception of the self in place, environmental ethics is then seen as a project of self-realization. Not all deep ecologists accept Naess's metaphysical claims, but the movement generally supports the changes in human behavior and institutions that Naess described.

The second school of thought that has had a profound impact on environmental ethics is ecofeminism.³⁷ Ecofeminist analyses often begin by pointing out the parallels between systems of domination that affect women and those that affect nature. Both women and the natural world have been portrayed as passive, irrational, and in need of control by civilizing forces, and these understandings have helped to justify their subordination. Ecofeminists argue that in many cases, it is the very same systems that oppress both women and the natural world: cultural assumptions privilege certain modes of interaction over others (for example, rational over non-rational modes of engagement), ethical systems take seriously certain forms of justification and not others (for example, appeals to abstract conceptions of beings and their rights rather than to the concrete and emotionally complex relationships in which situated beings find themselves), and human cultural self-understandings consider some activities to be crowning cultural achievements (agriculture, industrialization) and others (gathering food, raising children) to be just ordinary background activity.

In each case, ecofeminists argue, it is no coincidence that the privileged dispositions or activities are typically associated with men, and the others are typically associated with women and the natural world. If it is the same logic of domination that serves to justify both the oppression of women and the exploitation of the natural world, ecofeminists argue, then any adequate environmental ethic will have to address these root causes, which must involve challenging the ideology that serves to justify these forms of oppression.

One set of questions raised by both deep ecology and ecofeminism that has had a significant impact on environmental ethics, particularly in the 1990s, concerns the way we understand the distinction between the self and the natural environment. Both deep ecologists and ecofeminists criticize what they take to be common assumptions (at least within Western cultures) about the distinction between what is natural and what is artificial or cultural. Because many environmental ethicists think that things that are natural have a kind of value that is lacking in things that are not natural (claiming, for example, that we should care more about preserving wild species than domesticated species, and that wilderness has a kind of value that managed areas do not have), many important value claims depend on the distinction between the natural and the nonnatural.

Within environmental ethics, discussions of what constitutes 'naturalness' were often carried out in the context of claims about social constructivism. In an era where claims about the social construction of racial and gender categories were common, environmental ethicists argued over whether the categories of 'natural' and 'artificial'/'cultural' were social constructions as well.³⁸ Proponents argued that our views about what counts as 'natural' and why natural things are good are highly culturally specific. They point to the changes in our understandings of concepts like 'wilderness' as cultural values have changed.³⁹ Opponents argued that it is hubris for humans to think that our own cultural understandings determine what the natural world is and how it operates; we needn't think that the natural world only exists through our own interpretations.⁴⁰ The results of these debates weren't especially conclusive – most theorists appeared to agree that while our cultural values and assumptions affect how we characterize the natural world, including how we understand where its boundaries lie, it remains true that at least some things that we take to fall within this category (animals, plants, ecosystems, etc.) are what they are and do what they do independently of our cultural understandings of them.

6. Some Recent Trends in Environmental Ethics

Recent work in environmental ethics seems to have shared the goal of finding ways to talk about the moral importance of the natural environment that do not appeal to controversial claims about the metaphysics of value. One school of thought that has developed recently is environmental

virtue ethics. Following the resurgence of virtue ethics within mainstream ethical theory in the late 1980s and 1990s, some environmental ethicists looked to virtue ethical approaches for a more straightforward explanation of what is wrong with environmental destruction and what is good about environmental preservation.⁴¹ Although this project is still in its early stages, its proponents hope that virtue ethics will be able to show why people ought to act in a way that is environmentally responsible by pointing out the virtues manifested in environmental protection.⁴²

Another recent trend in environmental ethics is the embrace of value pluralism and the attempt to incorporate insights about value from theorists outside of ethics into ethicists' understanding of the value of the environment.⁴³ In this regard, environmental ethicists have taken a particular interest in discussions of value within economics, especially from the new subfields of environmental economics and ecological economics, and aesthetics, especially from the new subfield of environmental aesthetics. Within economics, theorists have been revisiting the standard assumptions of classical welfare economics and trying to describe different types of economic value (such as 'existence value') that might be able to adequately express the claims about the value of the natural world made by environmental ethicists.⁴⁴ Within aesthetics, discussions of the aesthetic value of the natural world have led theorists to ask what differences there are (or should be) between the aesthetic evaluation of art and the aesthetic evaluation of the natural world.⁴⁵ Allen Carlson has claimed, for example, that it is inappropriate to value a natural landscape merely in virtue of its formal properties. While the landscape of large-scale agricultural operation might have a kind of minimalist formal beauty, Carlson argues, our moral assessment of the ecological problems brought about by this kind of agriculture should affect our aesthetic assessment.⁴⁶ Analyses such as these have led many theorists to raise questions about how we should understand the relationship between aesthetic value and moral value. While these discussions about the nature of value are still in their early stages, if successful, they might offer a more sophisticated understanding of both the value of the natural world and the appropriate human responses that follow from that value.

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Short Biography

Katie McShane's research interests lie at the intersection of ethical theory, particularly the theory of value, and environmental ethics. Her work

explores the moral significance of the emotional attitudes that we take toward the natural world. She has published papers in journals such as *Environmental Ethics*, *Environmental Values*, and *Ethics, Place and Environment*. She also contributed a chapter to *Nature, Value, Duty: Life on Earth with Holmes Rolston, III*. Her current research analyzes the assumptions about value that might present in various valuing attitudes (in particular, awe and respect) that environmentalists often urge people to take toward the natural world. McShane is an Assistant Professor at Colorado State University. Prior to this, she was an Assistant Professor at North Carolina State University and a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Center for Ethics and the Professions. She holds a B.A. from Northwestern University and a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Notes

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¹ See, e.g., Routley; Rolston, 'Is There an Ecological Ethic?'; Regan, 'Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic'; Callicott, 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics'; Goodpaster.

² For the sake of brevity, I will hereafter use the term 'natural world' to refer to the nonhuman natural world.

³ An early exception to this widespread criticism of anthropocentrism is Norton, 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism'. The criticism of traditional ethical theories as anthropocentric, though frequently made in the early environmental ethics literature, doesn't apply equally well to all traditional theories. Hedonistic utilitarianism, for example, doesn't seem to be anthropocentric in the way described above. See Singer for a discussion of Bentham's utilitarianism in this regard. The above criticism is probably best thought of as applying to the versions of these traditional views that were most popular during the era when the criticisms were first raised.

⁴ Richard Routley has also published under the name Richard Sylvan.

⁵ See Routley 207–8.

⁶ Some authors use the term 'inherent value', 'inherent worth', or 'intrinsic worth' to refer to what I am calling here 'intrinsic value'.

⁷ See O'Neill, 'Varieties of Intrinsic Value'.

⁸ See, e.g., Routley and Routley, 'Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism'.

⁹ This idea goes back to Aristotle's Highest Good argument; see Beardsley for an early criticism of this line of reasoning.

¹⁰ For a discussion of this point, see Korsgaard and Green.

¹¹ See, for example, Callicott, 'Intrinsic Value in Nature'; Rolston, *Environmental Ethics*.

¹² See, for example, Regan, 'Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic'; Routley and Routley, 'Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism'.

¹³ For analyses of the different meanings attributed to the term 'intrinsic value' in the environmental ethics literature, see O'Neill, 'Varieties of Intrinsic Value'; McShane 46–9; Jamieson, *Ethics and the Environment* 68–75.

¹⁴ Callicott explains, 'I concede that, from the point of view of Scientific Naturalism, the source of all value is human consciousness . . . In other words, something may be valuable only because someone values it, but it may also be valued for itself' ('On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species' 142–3). See also Callicott, 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics'. Callicott later modified his views about intrinsic value to accommodate postmodernism. His later views can be found in Callicott, 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics'; 'Intrinsic Value in Nature'.

¹⁵ Rolston's criticisms of Callicott can be found in *Environmental Ethics* 112–16.

¹⁶ See Rolston, *Environmental Ethics*; 'Value in Nature and the Nature of Value'.

¹⁷ For a general discussion of the problems faced by these types of metaethical positions, see Miller.

¹⁸ See, for example, Elliot; Attfield, *Value, Obligation, and Meta-Ethics*; Jamieson, *Morality's Progress*; Carter.

¹⁹ See, for example, Singer, Agar, and Varner.

²⁰ See, for example, Callicott, 'Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic'; Katz, 'Organicism, Community, and the "Substitution Problem" '.

²¹ See Callicott, 'Animal Liberation'; Johnson; Katz, *Nature as Subject*.

²² While this criticism might apply to a pure holism such as that described above, most holists actually advocate a mixed view, claiming that wholes have moral value in addition to individuals, not instead of individuals.

²³ The charge of eco-fascism is from Regan, *Case for Animal Rights* 361–2. See also Varner, especially ch. 1.

²⁴ The classic article exposing these tensions is Callicott, 'Animal Liberation'.

²⁵ For examples of this assumption, see Sober and Hargrove.

²⁶ See Stone for an example of an argument for pluralism.

²⁷ This is roughly equivalent to what Wenz calls 'minimal pluralism'.

²⁸ I think that this is roughly what Light and Katz have in mind in describing what they call 'theoretical pluralism'.

²⁹ What I am referring to as 'theoretical pluralism' is what Wenz calls 'extreme pluralism' and what Light and Katz call 'metatheoretical pluralism'. See also Carter for a discussion of different kinds of pluralism.

³⁰ See Norton, *Toward Unity among Environmentalists*.

³¹ For a description of Norton's later understandings of this concept, see Norton, 'Pragmatism, Adaptive Management, and Sustainability'; Norton, *Sustainability*.

³² As Norton describes it, the convergence hypothesis asserts that, 'policies serving the interests of the human species as a whole, and in the long run, will serve also the "interests" of nature, and vice versa'. Norton, *Toward Unity among Environmentalists* 243. I take this to imply that all such policies, not just some of them, will converge, although this convergence might occur over the long term rather than in the short term.

³³ See, for example, Routley and Routley, 'Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future'.

³⁴ For classic articles on this topic, see Partridge and Parfit.

³⁵ See, for example, Guha and the articles collected in Bullard.

³⁶ The first statement of the principles of deep ecology is generally taken to be Naess. For a later elaboration, see Naess and Sessions. See also Devall and Sessions.

³⁷ For the most frequently cited description of ecofeminism, see Warren.

³⁸ See Bennett and Chaloupka; Cronon, *Uncommon Ground*; Evernden. For a more recent discussion of these issues, see O'Neill, Holland, and Light, 125–49.

³⁹ See, for example, Oelschlaeger; Nash; Cronon, 'Introduction'.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Rolston, 'Nature for Real'.

⁴¹ See, for example, Sandler and Cafaro; Sandler.

⁴² This typically involves, but need not be limited to, claiming that environmental protection promotes human flourishing.

⁴³ See Carter; O'Neill, *Ecology, Policy and Politics*; O'Neill et al.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Aldred; Attfield, 'Existence Value and Intrinsic Value'.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Brady; Budd; Berleant; Carlson.

⁴⁶ See Carlson 28–38.

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